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EVALUATING APPROPRIABILITY DEFENSES FOR THE
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT OF DOMINANT
FIRMS IN INNOVATIVE INDUSTRIES
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
In the 2004 Trinko decision, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he oppor-
tunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts
'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces inno-
vation and economic growth."1 The Court offered this remark to explain why
anticompetitive conduct is included as an element of the monopolization of-
fense and to provide a basis for questioning whether a unilateral refusal to
deal would satisfy that element.2
The Court's observation invites dominant firms in innovative industries to
defend against a monopolization challenge to their exclusionary conduct in
three ways,3 collectively called here an "appropriability defense. ' 4 The de-
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. The author is in-
debted to Rick Brunell, Joseph Drexl, Katie Glynn, Keith Hylton, Louis Kaplow, Rosie Lips-
comb, Paolo Ramezzana, Steve Salop, Carl Shapiro, John Woodbury, and to participants in the
Searle Center's Seventh Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy, the
Haifa-Loyola workshop on Recent Challenges to Antitrust, and the Twenty-Fifth Annual Meet-
ing of the American Law and Economics Association.
I Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
(dictum).
2 The Court explained:
To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct. ...
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them
uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of
their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it
may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those eco-
nomically beneficial facilities.
Id. at 407-08.
3 Throughout this article, the term "exclusion" encompasses conduct that disadvantages ri-
vals-for example by raising their costs or reducing their access to customers without necessa-
rily inducing them to exit-as well as the complete foreclosure of rivals.
4 Although this article is concerned only with antitrust challenges to the exclusionary conduct
of dominant firms, an appropriability defense could also be employed in other contexts, includ-
ing as an argument against liability for price fixing. Its possible application as a defense against
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fense could be an argument against liability: that the challenged conduct bene-
fits competition by increasing the return to the dominant firm's investment in
research and development (R&D), thereby enhancing that firm's incentives to
invest and the prospects for industry innovation. Relatedly, it could take the
form of an argument for construing the antitrust laws narrowly to avoid pro-
scribing the conduct in question, in order to avoid chilling dominant firm
R&D investment and industry innovation. In addition, it could take the form
of an argument against a particular remedy, such as a requirement that the
dominant firm sell to an excluded rival or otherwise collaborate with that ri-
val. The dominant firm may argue that the remedy would reduce the return to
its investment in R&D, again lessening the dominant firm's incentives to in-
vest and the prospects for industry innovation.
The term "appropriability" highlights the analogy between these arguments
and a familiar economic argument for patents: that the ability of patent hold-
ers to exclude others allows them to earn a greater profit by appropriating a
larger share of social gains from their innovations, and that prospect provides
prospective innovators with incentives for R&D investment.
Because an appropriability defense emphasizes incentives to undertake
R&D investment, it may be particularly attractive to dominant firms in high-
tech markets. Microsoft argued on appropriability grounds that the antitrust
laws should be construed narrowly in response to the government's monopoli-
zation complaint. The firm's economic expert contended, among other things,
that any relief that would reduce the profits to successful software develop-
ment would harm competition and consumers by lessening Microsoft's and
other firms' incentives to develop new and better software.5 Similarly, Intel,
anti-merger enforcement is discussed in C. Scott Hemphill, Higher Profits as a Merger Defense:
Innovation, Appropriability, and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION
LAW ANNUAL: 2010, at 43 (Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2013). Appropriability arguments
have also been deployed in opposition to a no-fault monopoly offense, the essential facilities
doctrine, and compulsory access to joint ventures, and in favor of research and development joint
ventures. See, e.g., Richard M. Brunell, Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much Is Enough?, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6-27 (2001).
1 Microsoft's expert contended that the government's antitrust theory would "outlaw" com-
mon practices and basic techniques of marketing and product development in the microcomputer
software industry by subjecting firms to antitrust liability "solely" because of their success. Rich-
ard L. Schmalensee, Direct Testimony 622, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 98-1232,
98-1233, 1999 WL 34757070 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1999). He further maintained that the remedies
sought by the government, as well as the economic analysis of government witnesses that sug-
gested that such remedies were necessary, "could lead to a serious reduction in investment in the
personal computer software industry, with devastating long-run consequences to consumers and
the U.S. economy." Id. 623. This prediction was based on concerns about appropriability. Id.
616 ("If investors believe that they will be denied these returns [to successful investments] due
to regulatory actions, it is likely that their willingness to fund the development of the next gener-




another large high-tech firm, expressed concern that the relief contemplated
by the Federal Trade Commission against alleged exclusionary conduct would
discourage product improvements by restricting the way that Intel designed
new products and exercised its intellectual property rights.6
The courts have given the appropriability defense a mixed reception. The
Supreme Court explicitly rejected it when it was proffered by the dominant
firm in Kodak.7 To similar effect, an influential district court decision in
United Shoe Machinery rejected the defense both on the law and the facts.8
6 Answer of Respondent Intel Corp. at 5, Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 31, 2009),
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/091231respanswertocmplt.pdf ("The relief con-
templated by the Complaint would require Intel to delay or even forgo product improvements
unless it could simultaneously ensure that such improvements equally benefited Intel competi-
tors, essentially requiring Intel to design its products for the benefit of its competitors rather than
for its own benefit and the benefit of consumers."); see also id. at 8 (The complaint "seek[s] to
strip Intel of intellectual property rights earned by Intel over many years of dedicated research
and enormous investment."). The FTC's wide-ranging exclusionary conduct complaint was set-
tled by consent in 2010. See Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Oct. 29, 2010) (Decision &
Order), www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/101102inteldo.pdf.
7 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (upholding circuit
court reversal of the district court's award of summary judgment to defendant Kodak on plain-
tiff's monopolization, attempted monopolization, and tying claims). Kodak had appealed to ap-
propriability as a defense to plaintiff's Sherman Act Section 2 claims when setting forth a free-
rider rationale for refusing to sell copier parts to the independent service organizations (ISOs).
The Court rejected its argument, as a matter of law, as inconsistent with precedent.
Kodak claims that its policies prevent ISO's from "exploit[ing] the investment Kodak
has made in product development, manufacturing and equipment sales in order to take
away Kodak's service revenues." Kodak does not dispute that respondents invest sub-
stantially in the service market, with training of repair workers and investment in parts
inventory. Instead, according to Kodak, the ISO's are free-riding because they have
failed to enter the equipment and parts markets. This understanding of free-riding has
no support in our case law. To the contrary, as the Court of Appeals noted, one of the
evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is the creation of entry barriers to potential com-
petitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously.
Id. at 485 (citation and footnote omitted). In this passage, the Court explains that the dominant
firm's exclusionary conduct (involving equipment and parts) will reduce rivals' incentives to
invest (in service), leading to less future competition (in service). This argument can be under-
stood as rejecting Kodak's appropriability defense on the ground that the dominant firm failed to
explain why its alleged disincentive to invest (in equipment and parts, but perhaps also in service
in the long run) would lead to less investment overall, accounting for investment by both the
dominant firm and its rivals, and, in consequence, harm future competition.
8 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), aff d,
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (finding unlawful monopolization by the leading manufacturer of shoe-
making machinery). The court explained:
Defendant seems to suggest that even if its control of the market is not attributable
exclusively to its superior performance, its research, and its economies of scale, none-
theless, United's market control should not be held unlawful, because only through the
existence of some monopoly power can the thin shoe machinery market support funda-
mental research of the first order, and achieve maximum economies of production and
distribution. To this defense the shortest answer is that the law does not allow an
enterprise that maintains control of a market through practices not economically inevi-
table, to justify that control because of its supposed social advantage.... Moreover, if
the defense were available, United has not proved that monopoly is economically com-
2016]
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By contrast, the Supreme Court in Trinko cited appropriability as the reason
that anticompetitive conduct is included as an element of the monopolization
offense and as a basis for questioning whether a unilateral refusal to deal
would satisfy that element.' Moreover, in a notable monopolization decision
addressing alleged predatory innovation, the Second Circuit in Berkey Photo
expressed resistance to finding antitrust liability when doing so would force
dominant firms to pre-disclose product improvements to rivals or otherwise
share the financial rewards to innovation, in part based on the appropriability
concern that such relief would undermine dominant firm incentives to invest
in R&D and develop new products. 10
The appropriability defense highlights one economic mechanism by which
exclusionary conduct may affect a dominant firm's incentives to innovate: it
could increase what the dominant firm anticipates earning from innovation,
thereby enhancing that firm's incentive to invest in R&D. But the same con-
duct may also discourage R&D investment by the dominant firm's rivals, by
reducing what those firms anticipate earning from innovation. Under circum-
stances discussed below, moreover, when rivals invest less, the dominant firm
will have less incentive to invest-thereby reducing or even reversing the
boost to the dominant firm's investment incentives resulting from increased
appropriability. For these reasons, innovation incentives overall, accounting
for both the dominant firm and its rivals, need not increase.
Antitrust enforcement against exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm
may thus increase overall innovation incentives, even though its immediate
consequence is to reduce what the dominant firm anticipates earning from
innovation. When enforcement encourages the formerly excluded rivals to in-
vest in R&D, the dominant firm may have an incentive to increase its own
pelled by the thinness of the shoe machinery market. It has not shown that no company
could undertake to develop, manufacture, and distribute certain types of machines,
unless it alone met the total demand for those types of machines. Nor has United
affirmatively proved that it has achieved spectacular results at amazing rates of speed,
nor has it proved that comparable research results and comparable economies of pro-
duction, distribution and service could not be achieved as well by, say, three important
shoe machinery firms, as by one.
Id.
9 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08
(2004).
10 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 284-85 (2d Cir. 1979) (deeming it
impossible to find Kodak liable for failing to take corrective action on its own for unadjudicated
prior offenses, concluding that a continuing predisclosure requirement would confer benefits on
rivals disproportionate to the competitive harms, and cautioning against a decree that might stifle
future innovation); see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1001 (D. Conn. 1978)
(seeking to avoid construing the antitrust laws to require sharing with competitors the financial
rewards to innovation, as doing so could harm investment incentives and "risk inhibiting the
commercialization of patented inventions to an extent inconsistent with the purposes of the pat-
ent laws"), remanded, 599 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1979).
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R&D investment in response, thereby reducing or reversing the disincentive
to R&D investment that flows from a reduction in the dominant firm's antici-
pated profits from innovation. In consequence, antitrust enforcement attacking
dominant firm exclusion may enhance innovation incentives overall,11 con-
trary to what the Supreme Court in Trinko suggested.
This article sets forth an analytical framework for evaluating whether con-
demning exclusionary behavior by a dominant firm under the antitrust laws
would benefit overall prospects for market innovation notwithstanding the
dominant firm's contention that the practices encourage its R&D effort by
enhancing appropriabilty. More specifically, the framework evaluates whether
a dominant firm would be expected to increase its own R&D efforts in re-
sponse to increased R&D by its rivals. If so, antitrust enforcement against
dominant firm exclusion would have two opposing effects on a dominant
firm's incentive to invest in R&D. That firm's innovation incentives would be
discouraged by a reduction in the anticipated returns to R&D investment, as
emphasized by the appropriability defense. But if a prohibition on exclusion-
ary conduct leads rivals to invest more in R&D, the dominant firm's innova-
tion incentives would simultaneously be enhanced, lessening or even
reversing the implications of reduced appropriability for dominant firm R&D.
The latter dynamic would tend to undermine the dominant firm's ap-
propriability defense and make it more likely that when the consequences of
antitrust enforcement for rival investment are also taken into account, industry
innovation incentives would be enhanced overall. Accordingly, when a domi-
nant firm would be expected to increase its own R&D effort in response to
increased R&D by its rivals, the dominant firm's anticipated response calls
into question whether to credit its appropriability defense.
Part I discusses the relevant economic theory and sets forth the framework
for evaluating whether the dominant firm would be expected to increase its
own R&D effort in response to increased R&D by its rivals. In Part II, the
facts of well-known monopolization cases against dominant firms in different
markets-Microsoft, IBM, and Xerox-are used to illustrate how the frame-
work can be applied to determine whether to question or accept a dominant
firm's appropriability defense in the context of antitrust enforcement.
I. EVALUATING AN APPROPRIABILITY DEFENSE
The economics literature provides two main reasons to expect that exclu-
sionary conduct that enhances a dominant firm's profits from innovating
would not lead to increased innovation incentives overall, accounting for both
11 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms, R&D Competi-
tion, and Innovation, 48 REv. INDUS. ORG. 269 (2016) [hereinafter Baker, Exclusionary
Conduct].
2016]
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the dominant firm and for its rivals. 12 First, the empirical economics literature
suggests that on average, the incentive to innovate to escape product market
competition plays at least as large a role in fostering innovation as the incen-
tive to obtain a greater reward for innovation success.13 This observation sug-
gests caution in crediting the appropriability defense generally4-a posture
which is also warranted because the social costs of erroneously insulating ex-
clusionary conduct involving innovation from antitrust enforcement may be
substantial-but it does not provide a framework for evaluating the defense
in individual cases.
12 These are not the only reasons that exclusionary conduct may reduce overall prospects for
innovation. See generally Brunell, supra note 4, at 29-37 (discussing six counterarguments to the
incentive argument for a permissive antitrust regime). Cf Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the
Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 661-62 (2014) (setting forth reasons why the imposi-
tion of a unilateral duty on a monopolist to deal with its rivals could either enhance or reduce
industry innovation).
13 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 583-86 (2007) [hereinafter Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs.
Arrow]; see also Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull's Eye?, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INvENTIVE ACTIvITY REVISITED 361, 376-82 (Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., 2012); John T. Scott & Troy J. Scott, Innovation Rivalry: Theory and Empirics, 41
ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE 25 (2014). Cf Chad Syverson, What Determines Productiv-
ity?, 49 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 326, 351-57 (2011) (greater market competition enhances produc-
tivity by encouraging the adoption of costly actions to raise productivity and by inducing the exit
of less productive firms); id. at 336-39 (product market competition is associated with the adop-
tion of best practices in management).
The Schumpeterian growth literature does not bear directly on the consequences for overall
industry innovation of the types of dominant firm exclusionary conduct considered in this article.
That literature concludes that greater product market competition fosters R&D investment by all
firms in sectors where the firms operate at the same technological level, Philippe Aghion et al.,
The Causal Effects of Competition on Innovation: Experimental Evidence 2, 10 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19987, 2014), and suggests that in the event that product
markets were to grow more competitive, the innovation incentives of a dominant firm with a
technological lead would remain high. Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit & Peter Howitt, What Do
We Learn from Schumpeterian Growth Theory? 13-14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 18824, 2013) (Prediction 2 & Figure 2) (explaining that greater product market
competition in markets with a technological leader mainly operates to discourage R&D invest-
ment by laggards until they have caught up). Carl Shapiro emphasizes that this literature models
increased product market competition as arising from greater imitation (hence reduced ap-
propriability for entrants) rather than as arising from increased contestability (hence increased
appropriability for entrants). Shapiro, supra, at 372-74. The antitrust interventions considered in
this article would increase entrant appropriability, consistent with the latter perspective.
14 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, "Dynamic Competition" Does Not Excuse Monopoliza-
tion, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2008, at 243 (concluding that a concern for ap-
propriability of R&D investments does not justify relaxing antitrust prohibitions against
monopolization).
15 If entrenched business interests-dominant firms and industry participants acting collec-
tively as though they were a dominant firm-are allowed to employ exclusionary conduct to
prevent the introduction of new products, new technologies, and improved ways of doing busi-
ness, the harm may go beyond the fortunes of individual industries and their customers to
threaten economy-wide growth and prosperity. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a
Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 559-60 (2013). A full analysis of innova-
tion-related error costs would also consider the possibility that the prospect of antitrust enforce-
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The second reason is the observation that in many markets the dominant
firm's payoff from innovation, and thus its incentives to invest in R&D,
would likely remain high even if its exclusionary conduct is prohibited be-
cause of market features ensuring that the dominant firm would continue to
profit substantially from successful innovation. These may include rapid mar-
ket growth, scale economies, network effects, sale of complementary prod-
ucts, and high customer switching costs. 16 This observation provides a basis
for rejecting the dominant firm's appropriability defense when the relevant
markets have these features, but leaves open the treatment of the defense in
markets that do not.
This article provides a framework for evaluating whether the dominant
firm's incentives to invest in R&D would remain high following the prohibi-
tion of exclusionary conduct and thus for questioning the dominant firm's
appropriability defense in markets where the defense cannot be rejected on the
ground that market features would likely preserve a strong incentive for the
dominant firm to invest in R&D after its exclusionary conduct is prohibited.
The framework is based on assessing the impact of increased R&D invest-
ment by rivals on the investment incentives of the dominant firm. 17
This article presumes that, by excluding rivals from a product market, the
dominant firm would reduce those rivals' incentive to invest in R&D aimed at
developing a competing product18 and thus that prohibiting the exclusionary
practices would increase rivals' R&D.19 When the dominant firm engages in
exclusionary conduct, its rivals are less likely to escape competition through
ment would chill procompetitive R&D. For a discussion of error cost analysis, see generally
Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error out of "Error Cost" Analysis: What's Wrong with Anti-
trust's Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015).
16 Brunell, supra note 4, at 32 (attributing this observation to Timothy Bresnahan in the policy
discussion of the Microsoft litigation); see also Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow, supra note
13, at 593-98. Cf Richard C. Levin, Appropriability, R&D Spending, and Technological Per-
formance, 78 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 424 (1988) (imperfect appropriability allowing
intra-industry R&D spillovers encouraged rapid technological progress in electronics-based in-
dustries without discouraging R&D investment).
17 These two possibilities-that market features may give the dominant firm a substantial
payoff from R&D investment even if competition is increased, and that the dominant firm may
have an incentive to increase its R&D investments in response to increased R&D investment by
its rivals-may collectively offer an explanation for the empirical observation that on average,
competition increases investment incentives overall.
18 The relevant R&D investments are those aimed at developing products that would substitute
for a next-generation product that the dominant firm is pursuing. Rivals may have an increased
incentive to develop products that would complement a next-generation product, but the antitrust
concern is typically with investment within the product market. R&D investment in developing
complementary products is not addressed in this article.
19 If an excluded rival pursues ways of inventing around a roadblock created by the dominant
firm, its nominal R&D expenditures could remain high and even grow. It is nevertheless appro-
priate to describe the rival as investing less in R&D relative to a but-for world in which there was
no exclusionary conduct, for two reasons: absent the exclusionary conduct, the rival may have
2016]
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innovation, so would have less incentive to invest in R&D. Another justifica-
tion for the presumption is an appropriability argument: with less ability to
obtain customers, excluded rivals would expect a lower payoff from their
R&D investments and so would have less incentive to invest. In addition, the
factors that tend to call into question the dominant firm's appropriability argu-
ment, discussed below, simultaneously tend to reinforce the connection be-
tween dominant firm exclusion and reduced rival R&D investment. 20 Hence,
in a litigation context, the assumption that rivals would invest more absent
dominant firm exclusionary conduct is most likely to be correct when it mat-
ters most: i.e., when, as the framework set forth in this article suggests, the
dominant firm's appropriability defense should not be credited.
A. PRODUCT MARKET EXCLUSION AND R&D INVESTMENT RIVALRY
To keep the economic analysis simple, this discussion makes a number of
assumptions. First, the dominant firm and its rivals compete in selling the
current generation of a product and in developing next-generation products.
21
Second, the foreclosure concern is with dominant firm conduct that excludes
its rivals from a product market, not with dominant firm conduct that raises
the costs of rival R&D. 22 Third, rivals are excluded from the post-innovation
product market; pre-innovation product market competition is unaffected by
the exclusionary conduct. 23 It is reasonable to focus solely on post-innovation
been able to avoid some of those expenditures or to pursue more promising approaches to up-
grading its product.
20 When a dominant firm's appropriability defense can be questioned on the ground that the
dominant firm would have an incentive to invest more in R&D in response to greater rival R&D
investment, rivals would be expected to respond to reduced dominant firm R&D investment by
increasing their own R&D investment. See Baker, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 8
(discussing how two factors which suggest that the dominant firm would respond to greater rival
R&D investment by investing more also suggest that rivals would respond to reduced dominant
firm investment by investing more). A third factor that is also discussed below, the dominant
firm's sale of complements, would not influence rivals' response to changing levels of dominant
firm investment. Hence, rivals' R&D investment would increase beyond the boost derived from
their greater ability to appropriate the profits from successful innovation, which would result
from antitrust condemnation of the dominant firm's exclusionary conduct. Accordingly, when a
dominant firm's appropriability defense is questioned based on the framework set forth in this
article, it is reasonable to assume that prohibiting exclusionary conduct would increase rival
investment in R&D.
21 In the case examples discussed in Part II, the firms compete to develop new products,
consistent with this assumption. Cf F.M. SCHERER, The Theory of Market Structure and Innova-
tion, in INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 59, 60 (1986) (viewing
"most industrial R&D [as] product oriented" rather than cost-saving process R&D). The related
economic theory article is also concerned mainly with new product development. Baker, Exclu-
sionary Conduct, supra note 11.
22 The conditions that would suggest questioning a dominant firm's appropriability defense for
product market exclusion would also suggest questioning such a defense if offered to justify
conduct raising rivals' R&D costs. See Baker, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 16-17.
23 The effect of exclusionary conduct on dominant firm innovation incentives may depend on
whether the dominant firm excludes its rival from pre-innovation competition or post-innovation
[Vol. 80
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exclusion when evaluating the appropriability defense because the dominant
firm will not proffer that defense unless it is concerned with the incentive
consequences of post-innovation product market competition. 24 Fourth, the
dominant firm's exclusionary conduct discourages R&D and innovation by its
rivals, 25 while increasing the expected return to dominant firm innovation.
Fifth, the primary competitive concern is with innovation, not price.26 Finally,
competition because the direct effects would be expected to go in opposite directions: pre-inno-
vation exclusion would reduce the dominant firm's incentive to innovate in order to escape com-
petition, while post-innovation exclusion would enhance the dominant firm's appropriability
incentive to innovate. See generally id.
24 When exclusionary conduct would affect both pre-innovation and post-innovation competi-
tion, the dominant firm's innovation incentive would likely depend primarily on the conse-
quences for post-innovation competition, the concern in this article, as the present value of
dominant firm profits in product markets after new products are introduced would commonly be
expected to exceed its profits while R&D is underway but before the products are introduced.
This generalization is not inconsistent with the successive innovation model of Segal and Whin-
ston. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Antitrust in Innovative Industries, 97 AM. ECON. REV.
1703, 1718-23 (2007). In that model, successful entrants displace incumbents but then become
subject to the possibility of displacement by future entrants. Segal and Whinston find that anti-
trust enforcement prohibiting exclusionary conduct increases the present value of entrant profits
from R&D, leads the entrant to increase its R&D investment, and raises the probability of entrant
innovation success when it increases the profits an entrant earns before it is displaced by more
than it reduces the discounted future profits an entrant earns after it is displaced. The profits an
entrant earns before it is displaced may be understood as the innovator's post-innovation profits,
and the profits it earns after it is displaced include the possibility of profiting through future re-
entry and thus may be viewed as future pre-innovation profits. Cf Joshua S. Gans, When Is Static
Analysis a Sufficient Proxy for Dynamic Considerations? Reconsidering Antitrust and Innova-
tion, in 11 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 55, 63 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2011)
(Segal & Whinston's model implies that the rate of entrant innovation increases by an antitrust
prohibition on any incumbent firm's practice "whose profitability is dependent on a reduction in
entrant innovation.").
25 The exclusionary conduct is assumed to reduce rival R&D investment even after accounting
for indirect effects involving the rival's response to changes in the dominant firm's R&D invest-
ment. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. This assumption allows the analysis to
focus on other economic questions: whether the exclusionary conduct raises or lowers the R&D
investment of the dominant firm, and, assuming that it raises that investment, whether total in-
vestment will increase or decrease, and whether economic welfare rises or falls.
26 Although exclusionary conduct in product markets would likely also discourage price com-
petition, this article focuses on its consequences for innovation. Cf Yongmin Chen, Refusal to
Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust, 30 J.L. ECON & ORG. 533 (2014) (concluding
that in a model with innovation and price competition upstream and price competition down-
stream, exclusionary conduct by a vertically integrated upstream producer limiting a potential
rival's access to the downstream market may increase the upstream firm's likelihood of innova-
tion by enhancing the return while reducing the likelihood of follow-on innovation and entry by
the potential upstream rival, with ambiguous effects on innovation). Increased innovation is pre-
sumed to enhance social welfare regardless of whether courts and enforcers are concerned with
consumer welfare or aggregate economic welfare. This presumption is consistent with the com-
mon conclusion of economists studying individual innovations that their benefits to society as a
whole greatly exceed the benefits to the firms that develop them. In theory, however, excessive
innovative effort may arise in cases where the innovator profits mainly by diverting business
from its rivals rather than by expanding the market. The social welfare effects of an antitrust
enforcement action would also depend on the consequences of the conduct for price competition,
which are not analyzed here.
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the product market lacks features that would preserve the dominant firm's
incentives to invest in R&D even if its exclusionary conduct is prohibited, as
such features would make it possible to reject the appropriability defense
without additional analysis. 27
Given these assumptions, dominant firm conduct excluding rivals from a
post-innovation product market affects the dominant firm's incentives to in-
vest in R&D through two routes, one direct and one indirect. The direct route
is emphasized by the appropriability story: putting aside influences arising
from the way the firms interact, exclusionary conduct would increase the
dominant firm's expected payoff to innovation and reduce the expected payoff
to rivals, boosting dominant firm R&D investment and chilling rival R&D
investment. The dominant firm's appropriability defense treats this dynamic
as the primary influence on incentives to innovate, 28 and tells the same story
in reverse: it argues that antitrust enforcement limiting exclusionary conduct
would allow rivals to innovate and compete, lessening the dominant firm in-
centive to invest in R&D even as it encourages rivals to invest.
This article emphasizes that the exclusionary conduct also affects dominant
firm innovation incentives through a second and indirect route: by the way the
dominant firm's incentives to invest in R&D depend on the R&D investments
of its rivals. That influence could, in principle, go in either direction: greater
rival investment could lead the dominant firm to invest either more or less
than it would invest if only the direct route mattered.29 The dominant firm's
response to the innovative effort of its competitors may be substantial even if
the rivals are not characterized as disruptive entrants or mavericks and even if
the rivals employ the same technology and business model as the dominant
firm.
Considering only the direct effect, antitrust enforcement against exclusion-
ary conduct would be expected to reduce dominant firm R&D and increase
rival R&D, with ambiguous effects on overall innovation prospects. But if the
dominant firm would respond to greater rival R&D by increasing its own
R&D investments, then the indirect (strategic) and direct forces would influ-
ence dominant firm R&D investment in opposing directions. If the indirect
27 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28 The appropriability defense also presumes that the boost to dominant firm incentives is
more important than the chill to rival incentives in determining overall innovation incentives.
This presumption is called into question by the empirical economics literature emphasizing the
importance of the motive to escape product market competition for the incentive to innovate.
Supra note 13 and accompanying text.
29 The example in the appendix to this article identifies conditions under which the dominant
firm would have an incentive to respond to greater rival investment by investing more (i.e.,




force is more important, the direct effect will be completely reversed: the
dominant firm will respond to antitrust enforcement by increasing its R&D
investment. Even if the direct route is the more important influence on domi-
nant firm R&D, an indirect force working in the opposite direction would
dampen the direct effect, making it more likely that, after accounting for rival
R&D,30 industry investment incentives will increase overall.31 Accordingly, a
dominant firm's appropriability defense should be questioned, and often re-
jected, if the dominant firm would be expected to increase its own R&D effort
in response to increased R&D by its rivals.3 2
When the dominant firm would be expected to react this way, greater prod-
uct market competition, the result of antitrust enforcement, would likely en-
hance overall innovation incentives by spurring R&D competition.
Conversely, if the dominant firm would be expected to reduce its own R&D
effort in response to increased R&D by its rivals, that strategic response
would be consistent with a dominant firm's appropriability defense.33
30 Analogous direct and indirect forces also influence rival investment incentives. Although
this article's focus on the appropriability defense leads it to emphasize the forces affecting domi-
nant firm incentives, a full economic analysis would consider both forces. See generally Baker,
Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11. If the direct and indirect effects on the dominant firm's
innovation incentives are both small, the dominant firm's R&D effort would not be affected
substantially by antitrust enforcement against exclusionary conduct, so overall innovation incen-
tives would depend primarily on the way an antitrust prohibition on exclusionary conduct affects
rival innovation incentives. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing circumstances
under which a dominant firm's innovation incentives would be largely unaffected by antitrust
enforcement against its exclusionary conduct).
31 Whether industry-wide innovation would benefit from rejecting an appropriability defense
and prohibiting the exclusionary conduct depends on whether the social benefit of encouraging
rival R&D investment exceeds the social harm of discouraging R&D investment by the dominant
firm. The indirect effect of the dominant firm's response to rival R&D investment could limit the
harm side of that balance.
32 This discussion is concerned with the dominant firm's appropriability defense, not with the
dominant firm's motive to exclude. The dominant firm may find exclusionary conduct profitable
regardless of whether it would respond to an increase in rival R&D investment by increasing or
reducing its own R&D efforts.
33 A dominant firm might seek to support its appopriability defense by showing that that it
would not have invested in R&D in the past had it not anticipated being able to exclude its rivals.
The probative value of such a claim for showing that exclusionary conduct is needed to preserve
the dominant firm's future incentive to invest in R&D may depend on how that firm analyzed the
benefits and costs of R&D in the past (for example, whether it anticipated that it would lose a
substantial market if both it and its rivals upgraded their products absent exclusionary conduct,
and whether its past analysis accounted for the indirect as well as the direct effects of exclusion-
ary conduct on its R&D incentives), and whether conditions are similar (for example, whether,
absent the exclusionary practices, it would still be as susceptible to share erosion as it thought it
was then, and whether new aspects of market structure would make R&D investment attractive
for the dominant firm absent the ability to exclude). Such evidence would bear on the dominant
firm's incentives to invest in R&D, as distinct from incentives overall.
2016]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
B. THE DOMINANT FIRM'S RESPONSE TO RIVAL R&D INVESTMENT
The above analysis of the overall consequence of exclusionary conduct for
innovation turns on whether the dominant firm would respond to increased
rival R&D investment by increasing its own R&D investment-that is, on
whether the dominant firm regards rival R&D as what economists term a
"strategic complement." If so, and if the strategic complementarity is suffi-
ciently powerful, antitrust intervention to prevent exclusionary conduct by a
dominant firm would be expected to encourage industry innovation on bal-
ance to the benefit of consumers.3 4 Under such circumstances, the dominant
firm's appropriability defense should be rejected.35 If instead the dominant
firm would respond to increased rival R&D investment by reducing its own
R&D investment, that response would be consistent with the dominant firm's
appropriability defense.
Firms often know a great deal about rival R&D investments even though
their level and nature is not fully transparent to outsiders before new products
are introduced. Firms may know that rivals have an active R&D effort, the
technical expertise to purse next generation products, or a track record of suc-
cessful product upgrades. Firms also commonly learn what their rivals tell
investors about future products, and what R&D efforts industry observers
think their rivals are pursuing. Firms may also learn about rivals' planned
upgrades when those competitors discuss their needs and plans with input
suppliers or retailers. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that when the R&D
investment incentives of industry participants change substantially-as would
be expected when a dominant firm adopts challenged exclusionary practices
or when a court prohibits those practices-that the dominant firm can make
an informed judgment about the way the nature and level of its rivals' R&D
activity will change, that the dominant firm expects that its rivals can do the
same with respect to the dominant firm's R&D effort, and that the dominant
firm can make an informed judgment about the way rivals' R&D investment
will respond to changes in its own R&D investments. Accordingly, it will
commonly be appropriate to account for the way the dominant firm reacts to
rival R&D in evaluating the innovation consequences of an antitrust challenge
to its exclusionary conduct.3 6
34 See generally Baker, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11.
35 Even if the dominant firm's response is not sufficiently powerful for industry innovation
incentives to increase overall, the presence of some response may mean that overall incentives do
not decrease much, so there is little innovation cost to antitrust intervention. Then any net inno-
vation benefit of increased appropriability may be more than offset by the harm to consumers
from the loss in product competition arising from the exclusionary conduct, as when that conduct
permits the dominant firm to maintain its market power.
36 Even if the dominant firm's expectations about rival R&D investment turn out to be incor-
rect in retrospect, moreover, those expectations are relevant to evaluating the innovation conse-
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Although the direction of a dominant firm's response to rivals' conduct can
be difficult to anticipate,3 7 economic theory suggests an approach to doing so
with respect to R&D investment.38 That approach is based on comparing the
payoffs the dominant firm receives in various future situations defined by
whether or not the dominant firm or its rivals successfully innovate. In partic-
ular, the dominant firm will treat rival R&D investment directed toward new
products as a strategic complement when the incremental benefit of innova-
tion to the dominant firm is greater when rival innovation succeeds than when
it fails.39 Intuitively, when a rival increases its R&D investment, the rival's
likelihood of innovation success will increase. If the dominant firm's incre-
mental gain from innovation success is greater when the rival succeeds than
when the rival fails, the dominant firm will seek to improve its own prospects
for innovation success by investing more in innovation, too, thus treating rival
R&D as a strategic complement.
In consequence, the nature of the strategic interaction in R&D competition
can be inferred from potentially observable aspects of market structure. Most
importantly, as indicated in the example set forth as an appendix to this arti-
cle, a dominant firm is more likely to treat rival R&D as a strategic comple-
ment when (1) the dominant firm anticipates that it would have a high market
share when both it and its rival successfully innovate,40 and (2) the dominant
firm anticipates that it would lose a great deal of business to its rivals if the
rivals innovate and it does not.41 Both factors increase the dominant firm's
quences of an antitrust prohibition on exclusionary conduct because they guide the dominant
firm's R&D investment decisions.
37 Cf Brunell, supra note 4, at 4-6, 37-38 (emphasizing difficulty of determining whether to
prefer appropriability arguments or competition counterarguments in general or on a case-by-
case basis); Lao, supra note 12, at 661 ("It is difficult to predict reliably the incentive and net
innovation effects of antitrust enforcement against dominant firm conduct.").
38 The dicusssion in the text is based on the related economics article: Baker, Exclusionary
Conduct, supra note 11. Outside of that framework, suppose that firms can finance R&D less
expensively out of retained earnings than through external finance, perhaps because of informa-
tion asymmetries between innovators and investors or lenders. Then, one might imagine that
exclusionary conduct by an innovator would simultaneously reduce rival R&D investment and
raise the innovator's R&D investment through direct effects on the cost and availability of capi-
tal not related to the strategic issues emphasized here. In this dynamic, the innovator would
behave as though its rival's R&D investment is a strategic substitute, although the reason that
R&D investments are negatively correlated would not be strategic. Such a capital markets imper-
fection is more likely to matter to an entrant or fringe rival than to the large and established
dominant firms in the case examples considered below, however, so will not be considered fur-
ther in this article.
39 See Baker, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 7.
40 Conversely, if the dominant firm expects that its high share could substantially erode if both
it and its rivals innovate, perhaps because its success with current-generation customers gives it
little advantage in attracting next-generation customers, then it may have an incentive to treat
rival R&D as a strategic substitute, consistent with its appropriability defense.
41 Conversely, if the dominant firm anticipates that it would not lose much business to its
rivals in the event the rivals alone introduced new products, the dominant firm would have an
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incremental gains from developing a next-generation product when its rivals
introduce an upgrade-the first factor by raising the benefits of dominant firm
innovation when rivals also innovate, and the second by raising the cost to the
dominant firm of not matching rival innovation. Hence each increases the
dominant firm's incremental benefit from new product introduction given that
its rivals also do so, relative to the firm's incremental benefit when its rivals
do not upgrade.
The example in the appendix also points to a third factor relevant to deter-
mining whether the dominant firm will regard rival R&D as a strategic com-
plement: the nature and extent of competition in markets for complementary
products. When a new product introduction is expected to increase the sales of
complementary products, 42 and those sales would be very profitable to the
dominant firm (as when it is the only seller of the complementary goods), the
dominant firm would care mainly about ensuring that some firm introduce a
new product, so its incremental gain from upgrading its own product condi-
tional on its rival introducing a new product would be small. In consequence,
the dominant firm would not treat rival R&D as a strategic complement.43
The case studies in the next Part illustrate how to analyze these three fac-
tors-the dominant firm's likely market share when both firms innovate, the
dominant firm's likely customer loss if a rival upgrades when it does not, and
the impact of innovation on the dominant firm's profits in the sale of comple-
incentive to regard rival R&D as a strategic substitute. This observation is consistent with the
conduct of the Big Three U.S. automakers (Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors) during the
1970s. The large U.S. firms accommodated the aggressive research and development of then-
small Japanese rivals (Nissan and Toyota) in developing subcompact models, most likely in part
because the U.S. firms reasonably questioned the ability of their fringe rivals to expand, even
with attractive new products. Jonathan B. Baker, Fringe Firms and Incentives to Innovate, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 621, 637 (1995). Three other factors also may have encouraged the Big Three to
regard fringe firm R&D as a strategic substitute: their desire to avoid cannibalizing the sales and
profits of their existing midsize automobiles, risk aversion, and the threat new products could
pose to coordination among the Big Three firms. Id. at 634-39.
42 A dominant firm in one market (hardware) may earn most of its profits on sales in that
market while facing competition in a complementary product (content). See Ron Adner, Jianqing
Chen & Feng Zhu, Frenemies in Platform Markets: The Case of Apple's iPad vs. Amazon's
Kindle 3-4 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 15-087, 2015) (concluding that a smaller hard-
ware platform may find it profitable to allow customers of a larger hardware platform to access
its content, while the large hardware platform does not allow customers of the smaller platform
similar access).
43 This discussion assumes that the dominant firm's sale of complements is not a market factor
that ensures that the dominant firm will continue to profit greatly from R&D investment even if
it is prohibited from undertaking exclusionary conduct, although complements could play that
role under some circumstances. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. If the dominant firm's
payoff to R&D investment would remain high after antitrust enforcement for that reason, the
dominant firm would continue to have a strong incentive to invest in R&D even if it did not
regard rival R&D as a strategic complement, justifying a rejection of the dominant firm's ap-
propriabilty defense without need to apply the analytical framework set forth in this article. See
also infra note 73 and text accompanying note 100.
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mentary products-to identify the likely response of dominant firms to in-
creased R&D investment by a rival and evaluate whether to question an
appropriability justification for the dominant firm's exclusionary conduct.
II. ANALYZING AN APPROPRIABILITY DEFENSE IN THREE
CLASSIC MONOPOLIZATION CASES
This Part turns to three classic antitrust monopolization cases involving the
development of new products: the government's monopolization case against
Microsoft arising from that firm's exclusion of Netscape and Java, the IBM
plug compatibility cases (which are treated as a single case), and the FTC's
patent portfolio case against Xerox. Those cases are used to illustrate how the
factors set forth in Part I can be employed to analyze the dominant firm's
likely response to rival investment in R&D. In discussing each case, this arti-
cle will presume that antitrust enforcement would increase rival incentives to
invest in R&D and the likelihood that a rival will introduce a next generation
product, and that the dominant firm argues against liability or relief on the
ground that enforcement would lessen the dominant firm's incentive to invest
in R&D by reducing its reward to introducing a new product, harming innova-
tion incentives overall. The discussion does not evaluate whether an ap-
propriability defense should or should not have applied, but instead
demonstrates the workability of the analytical framework by illustrating how
the issue would be approached on the facts of each case. Although the cases
discussed below cover a diverse set of competitive effects theories, they do
not address the full range of exclusionary conduct that a dominant firm could
seek to justify with an appropriability defense.
A. MICROSOFT (Netscape and Java)
In 2001, the D.C. Circuit upheld a district court decision finding that
Microsoft, the dominant firm in personal computer operating systems, unlaw-
fully maintained its monopoly power through exclusionary conduct.44
Microsoft's conduct indirectly excluded operating system rivals by impeding
the success of two firms developing new products in complementary markets:
Netscape, which was developing a browser, and Sun Microsystems, which
was developing the Java programming language. These products had the po-
tential to allow applications programs written for Microsoft's operating sys-
tem to run on rival operating systems as well, thereby making rival operating
44 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). This high-profile
litigation has been the subject of two books. ANDREW I. GAvIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT
ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRsT CENTURY (2014); WILLIAM H.




systems better substitutes for Microsoft's Windows and enhancing operating
system competition with Windows.
Netscape was impeded through exclusivity agreements and other conduct
that limited Netscape's access to key channels of product distribution. 45 Sun
was impeded through exclusivity agreements and other conduct that favored
the distribution of Java with modifications created by Microsoft that would
prevent software applications from working on personal computers that used
Sun's Java.46 In the jargon of the case, Netscape and Sun's new products had
the potential to erode the "applications barrier to entry" that limited the com-
petitive prospects of Microsoft's operating systems rivals. 47 By excluding
these suppliers of third products, Microsoft forestalled the development of key
building blocks that rival operating systems could use when developing next
generation operating system products to make them compete better with
Microsoft's Windows operating system.48 As a result, the prospects for future
innovation and price competition in operating systems were reduced.49
Microsoft and its economic expert defended the firm's practices, in part on
appropriability grounds, as protecting the incentives of software firms, includ-
ing Microsoft, to develop new and better software products.50 As applied to
Microsoft itself, this justification may be evaluated by analyzing how that
firm would likely respond to increased innovative effort by its rivals or, more
precisely in this case, how it would respond to increased innovative effort by
firms selling complements when improvements to complementary products
45Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59-74. The other exclusionary practices included integrating
Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser into that firm's Windows operating system. According to
a statement attributed to Microsoft, Microsoft intended to "cut off Netscape's air supply." John
Schwartz, Government, Microsoft Present Contrary Views of Trial, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1999,
at E3.
46 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 74-77. The other exclusionary practices included deceiving Java
developers about the Windows-specific nature of the tools Microsoft distributed to them and
coercing Intel to stop aiding Sun in improving Java technologies. One Microsoft document de-
scribed the firm's conduct as aimed at increasing the market for "polluted" Java. Id. at 77.
47 See id. at 55 (defining "applications barrier to entry").
48 Together, Netscape's browser and Java had the potential to allow applications programs to
access application programming interfaces, thereby allowing applications programs to run on any
operating system supporting the browser and Java and, in consequence, eroding the applications
barrier to entry that was protecting Windows from competition from rival operating systems. See
id. at 53-56.
49 The monopolization allegations-the primary focus of the litigation and the opinions of the
district and appeals courts-focused on competitive harms in an operating system market. The
public debate over Microsoft's conduct also concerned possible competitive harms in a browser
market.
50 See supra note 5; see also Brunell, supra note 4, at 28 (discussing testimony of Microsoft's
economic expert, Richard Schmalensee). In addition, Microsoft's "freedom to innovate" advo-
cacy outside the courtroom could be understood as resting implicitly on an appropriability justifi-




would increase the ability of rival operating systems to compete with Win-
dows.51 If Microsoft would be led to increase its own innovative efforts, its
response would provide a reason to question Microsoft's appropriability justi-
fication for its exclusionary conduct.5 2
Testimony by Microsoft's economic expert, interpreted through the lens of
the analytical framework set forth in Part I above, raises the possibility that
Microsoft would have behaved this way. According to that testimony, with
software generally and, presumably, operating systems in particular, rivals
need to leapfrog incumbents in order to succeed. Because customers make
investments predicated on their existing software, the expert testified, rivals
cannot succeed when introducing new products if their products are no better
than those of incumbent market leaders.53 This testimony suggests that
Microsoft would likely have anticipated maintaining a high market share if it
and one or more of its operating system rivals introduced upgrades, even if the
applications barrier to entry were reduced through antitrust enforcement.
Microsoft's expert also testified that entrants can win in software markets-
operating system markets included5 4-by introducing new products that re-
present substantial improvements,55 and thereby displace current market lead-
ers.5 6 If so, an operating system rival would be expected to take a great deal of
51 This discussion presumes that when operating systems rivals foresaw the prospect that the
applications barrier to entry would be reduced and their ability to compete with Windows in-
crease, they would have an incentive to invest more in developing improvements to their own
operating systems.
12 Microsoft's appropriability justification could also have been questioned on the ground that
its payoff from innovation in operating systems (the market Microsoft was found to have monop-
olized), and thus its incentives to invest in operating system R&D, would likely have remained
high even if its exclusionary conduct is prohibited, because network effects and customer switch-
ing costs meant Microsoft would profit through increased sales of complementary software. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text. In order to focus the present discussion on the analytical
framework for evaluating the way Microsoft would respond to rival R&D, this possibility is
assumed away.
53 See Schmalensee, supra note 5, 37 ("Competitors cannot win by introducing a trivial
advance over existing leaders" in the microcomputer software industry "because that would re-
quire asking consumers to scrap investments in their current software for minimal gain"); see
also id. 33 (Consumers "stay with the current leader until a product comes along that is suffi-
ciently superior to warrant abandoning their investments in the leader."). The testimony was
couched in terms of software generally, but it is evident that it was intended to apply to operating
systems software in particular.
54 See id. 37 ("Entry and success in computer operating systems appears harder than for
most microcomputer software categories" but it is "eminently feasible.").
55 See id. 37 ("Firms try to win by 'leapfrogging' the existing leader with substantial
improvements.").
56 See id. 32-36.
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business from Microsoft by introducing a next-generation operating system
when Microsoft did not.
5 7
These two factors-Microsoft's likely high market share if it and rivals
both innovated, and Microsoft's likely anticipation of substantial customer
loss if a rival upgraded when Microsoft did not-suggest that Microsoft
would have benefited more by improving Windows if its rivals improved their
own operating systems than if its rivals did nothing.58 If so, Microsoft would
have been expected to respond to increased R&D investment by rivals-or,
based on the facts of the case, to have responded to the likelihood that
Microsoft's operating system rivals would have taken advantage of an erosion
of the applications barrier to entry to develop upgraded operating systems-
by increasing its own R&D effort.59 Such an inference about Microsoft's
likely behavior would have called into question Microsoft's claim, based on
the appropriability logic, that antitrust enforcement would have lessened its
incentive to innovate.
B. IBM (PLUG COMPATIBILITY)
The IBM plug compatibility cases, which will be treated as a single case,
involved competition in computer peripherals. 60 During the late 1960s and
57 This aspect of the expert's testimony was offered in support of the expert's claim, contested
by the government and rejected by the courts, that entry was easy in operating systems notwith-
standing the challenged practices. The implication highlighted here, about the likely success of a
new operating system introduced by a rival and not matched by Microsoft in the event the appli-
cations barrier were reduced, would have been less controversial.
58 The third factor identified in Part I, Microsoft's profits from the sale of complementary
products, seems unlikely to have influenced that firm's response to rival R&D in operating sys-
tems. To conclude otherwise, one would need to suppose that operating system improvements
would substantially increase the sales of Microsoft's applications programs, such as its Office
suite.
59 Microsoft argued for a product market that included middleware (such as browser software
and Java) along with operating systems, suggesting that it viewed the two products as substitutes.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For that reason, and given
the steps Microsoft took to integrate its browser into Windows, Microsoft may have viewed
improvements in browsers as innovation in operating systems. If so, the browser feature competi-
tion between Microsoft's Internet Explorer and the rival Firebox browser during the mid-2000s
can be understood as consistent with the view that Microsoft would treat rival operating system
R&D as a strategic complement. See, e.g., Erik Larkin, Radically New IE 7 or Updated Mozilla
Firefox 2 Which Browser Is Better?, PCWORLD (Oct. 24, 2006), www.pcworld.com/article/
127309/article.html (describing browser feature competition).
60 Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1983); Cal. Com-
puter Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894
(10th Cir. 1975). The government's long-running case against IBM, which the government dis-
missed in 1982, addressed, in part, similar allegations. FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JOHN J. McGOWAN
& JOEN E. GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MULTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S.
v. IBM 12, 13-14, 360-68 (1983) (After an initial verdict in favor of private plaintiffs (later
reversed) in Telex, the government added similar allegations.); id. at 1, 368-69 (The government
sought dismissal after concluding that the case was "without merit."). Assistant Attorney General
William Baxter ended the government's case notwithstanding his expectation that the govern-
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early 1970s, IBM was the leading manufacturer of central processing units
(CPUs) for general purpose computers, and likely accounted for the majority
of shipments. 61 In addition, IBM, along with multiple rivals, sold peripheral
equipment (tapes, disks, printers, and terminals) that worked with IBM's com-
puters. IBM may have had a monopoly share in markets for plug-compatible
peripherals during the early 1970s.
62
When IBM introduced a new generation computer system in the early
1970s, it changed the way peripheral equipment was connected. Its new CPUs
were incompatible with the peripherals that worked with its prior generation
computers and compatible only with new peripheral products sold by IBM.
Several rival manufacturers of plug-compatible peripherals challenged this
conduct as monopolization. 63 In resolving this aspect of the cases, the courts
implicitly accepted an appropriability justification for some of IBM's con-
duct: they declined to condemn IBM's product design decisions found to en-
hance product quality or reduced manufacturing costs, 64 in part to avoid
chilling that firm's incentives to innovate.
65
ment would prevail at trial and on appeal. John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument
to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 146 n.6 (2000).
61 IBM's share of general purpose computers (the market in the cases most closely related to
CPUs) was estimated at 57% in one case. In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig.,
481 F. Supp. 965, 981-82 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (accepting a 57% share for the 1969 through 1975
period), aft'd, Transamerica Computer Co., 698 F.2d at 1381, 1382. In another case, witnesses
for plaintiff asserted that IBM's market share in general purpose computers was between 60%
and 80% for unspecified years, likely the early 1970s, although IBM questioned those figures.
California Computer Products, 613 F.2d at 738-39. A third district court cited internal IBM
documents as estimating that firm's share of CPUs at 64% in 1968 and cited the U.S. Bureau of
the Census as estimating that in 1971 IBM accounted for 41% of the value of shipments of
"Electronic Computers, Digital, General Purpose" (not the same as CPUs, but the closest analog
in the census data referenced). Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 285-86 (N.D. Okla. 1973),
rev'd, 510 F.2d 894. The appellate panel reviewing that decision characterized the district court
as estimating IBM's market share at 35%, apparently referring to a revenue share figure the
district court cited for electronic data processing as a whole rather than specifically for CPUs.
Telex, 510 F.2d at 899.
62 Telex, 367 F. Supp. at 286-90 (citing testimony that in 1970 IBM had revenue shares of
90%, 68%, 99.6% and 92.3% in various peripheral products, and IBM documents indicating unit
shares of 80%, 94%, and 99% for certain peripheral products); IBM Peripheral EDP Devices,
481 F. Supp. at 986-87 (average market share of 54% for one peripheral product and 77% for
another between 1969 and 1975). See California Computer Products, 613 F.2d at 738 (Plaintiff
offered evidence that IBM's markets share in peripherals fell from 79% to 68% from 1970 to
1972; IBM's evidence was that its share was less than 30%.).
63 Plaintiffs also unsuccessfully alleged that price cuts by IBM on peripherals amounted to
predatory pricing. California Computer Products, 613 F.2d at 743; Telex, 510 F.2d at 926, 928;
IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1002; ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458
F. Supp. 423, 433-34 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aft'd, Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1980).
64 California Computer Products, 613 F.2d at 744; IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F.
Supp. at 1002-03.
65 An appropriate legal standard for design conduct "must properly balance a concern for the
preservation of desirable incentives with the need to prevent monopolization by technology."
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To illustrate how an appropriability defense could have been evaluated in
this setting using the framework set forth in Part I, the discussion will focus
on IBM's incentives to develop next-generation peripherals, the markets that
were allegedly monopolized through exclusionary conduct.66 The discussion
will further suppose that antitrust enforcement would increase R&D invest-
ment by rival manufacturers of peripherals. If IBM would respond to greater
innovative effort by its peripherals rivals by increasing its own innovative
efforts, that response would tend to undermine an appropriability justification
for IBM's exclusionary conduct.
IBM would likely respond this way if it would expect to benefit more by
developing next generation peripherals if its rivals also introduced upgraded
peripheral products than by upgrading if its rivals did not innovate. 67 The
framework set forth in Part I suggests that whether this condition holds would
depend importantly on three factors: (1) IBM's expected market share if all
firms introduced new products, (2) IBM's expected customer loss if only its
rivals upgraded, and (3) the consequences of new peripherals for the demand
for computer systems, an important complementary product also sold by IBM.
Based on the description of the industry in the court opinions, it is plausible
that IBM would have anticipated maintaining a high market share in peripher-
als if, absent the challenged incompatibility, both it and rivals had introduced
next-generation products. Factors like customer loyalty, brand reputation, and
service would likely have protected IBM's share to a substantial extent, 68 al-
though the fact that IBM's share in current generation peripherals had been
declining could suggest otherwise. 69 Moreover, that share decline, in a market
IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003. "Truly new and innovative products are to
be encouraged .... " Id. Modem courts take a similar view:
As a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has
been hanned by a dominant firm's product design changes. In a competitive market,
firms routinely innovate in the hope of appealing to consumers, sometimes in the pro-
cess making their products incompatible with those of rivals; the imposition of liability
when a monopolist does the same thing will inevitably deter a certain amount of inno-
vation .... Judicial deference to product innovation, however, does not mean that a
monopolist's product design decisions are per se lawful.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
66 IBM could also have argued that relief that would limit its ability to profit in the sale of
peripherals could chill its incentives to develop improved computer CPUs, a complementary
product. Evaluating such a claim would require a separate analysis not undertaken here.
67 Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
68 IBM maintained a substantial market share in peripherals for years after rivals developed
peripherals compatible with IBM's new generation computer.
69 Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 287, 290 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894
(10th Cir. 1975); California Computer Products, 613 F.2d at 738. The parties disagreed over the
speed and extent of the share decline. Id. If the pre-innovation share decline was substantial and
rapid, it could have suggested instead that IBM would not have kept a high peripherals share in
the event both it and its rivals introduced new products and that IBM would have regarded rival
R&D as a strategic substitute, consistent with an appropriability defense.
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in which both IBM and rivals introduced new products, suggests that rivals
would have taken substantial peripheral business away from IBM by upgrad-
ing peripherals if IBM did not also do so. 70
Together these two factors suggest that IBM could have benefited substan-
tially by upgrading peripherals in the event its rivals also did so. By innovat-
ing, IBM may have been able to avoid the costly outcome in which only its
rivals introduced new products, and IBM could have earned substantial profits
in the event both it and its rivals upgraded. The difference in profitability
between those outcomes could well have exceeded the incremental gain to
IBM from introducing new peripherals in the event it was the only firm to do
so. If so, IBM would likely have responded to greater innovative effort by its
peripherals rivals-as might have been the product of antitrust enforcement
against IBM's conduct-by increasing its own innovative effort. Such a re-
sponse would provide a basis for questioning an appropriability defense.
This tentative conclusion could be overturned by considering the conse-
quences of the development of next generation peripherals for the sale of
computer central processing units, a complementary product in which IBM
likely had a high share. 71 If new peripheral products would have led customers
to buy new computers from IBM regardless of which firm sold the peripher-
als, 72 and if computer sales were much more profitable to IBM than peripheral
equipment sales, then IBM would have benefited from the introduction of new
peripherals regardless of whether the new products came from IBM or its
rivals. That could mean that the incremental benefit to IBM from innovating
in peripherals would have been greater if rivals did not innovate than if they
did, contrary to what was suggested by considering only the first two factors.
Upgrading its peripherals when rivals did not do so would have boosted
IBM's computer demand, while upgrading its peripherals when rivals intro-
duced new products would not have added much to computer demand (which
would already have gone up with the peripheral introductions of IBM's
rivals).
70 Some customers who would have preferred IBM's peripheral products if both IBM and its
rivals offered same-generation products would likely have adopted rival products if the rivals
introduced new products while IBM did not.
71 The discussion in this paragraph assumes that the dominant firm's sale of complements is
not a market factor that ensures that the dominant firm will continue to profit greatly from R&D
investment even if it is prohibited from undertaking exclusionary conduct. Supra note 16 and
accompanying text. If that assumption is incorrect, and the dominant firm's payoff to R&D
investment would remain high after antitrust enforcement because it would expect to profit in an
increased sale of computer central processing units, the dominant firm would continue to have a
strong incentive to invest in peripheral products R&D even if it did not regard rival R&D as a
strategic complement, making it unnecessary to apply the analytical framework set forth in this
article.




IBM thus might have responded to antitrust enforcement by cutting back on
its own effort, consistent with what an appropriability defense would main-
tain, if the profitability of complementary products was the dominant influ-
ence on IBM's response to rival innovative effort.73 But there is reason to
question whether IBM's profits on CPUs were so much more profitable than
its profits on peripheral sales as to be the primary consideration in undertaking
peripheral R&D, 74 and thus to question whether the presence of complements
would lead IBM to treat rival R&D as a strategic substitute rather than a stra-
tegic complement.
C. XEROX (PATENT PORTFOLIO)
In 1975, the Federal Trade Commission and Xerox-then the dominant
firm in plain paper copying-agreed to settle by consent an FTC case con-
cerned largely with Xerox's accumulation of patents.7 5 The FTC's chief econ-
omist at the time later explained that the case centered on "the extension over
time of [Xerox's] monopoly through patent accumulation." 76 The FTC was
concerned that that Xerox's extensive patent portfolio discouraged competi-
73 Even if IBM would cut back on its own R&D in peripheral products in response to greater
innovative effort by its rivals-in which case the indirect effect on its incentives to invest in
R&D would work in the same direction as the direct effect-both effects could be small. That is,
even after accounting for the loss of appropriability and IBM's response to greater rival R&D,
IBM's incentive to invest in new peripherals (as a way to boost the sale of central processing
units) could remain high. If so, IBM's sale of complements would operate as a market factor
ensuring that the dominant firm will continue to profit greatly from R&D investment even if it is
prohibited from undertaking exclusionary conduct. Supra note 16 and accompanying text. This
possibility, which was assumed away, would justify a rejection of IBM's hypothetical ap-
propriability defense without a need to apply the analytical framework set forth in this article
(and without regard to whether IBM treated rival R&D as a strategic complement or strategic
substitute). Infra text accompanying note 100.
74 Peripheral equipment was responsible for 50% to 70% of computer system prices. Telex,
367 F. Supp. at 277. It would be possible for CPUs to account for the lion's share of IBM's
profits if IBM earned narrow profit margins on peripheral equipment and large margins on
CPUs. IBM's margins on peripherals were not small, however. IBMs margins on disk products
were reportedly 47% to 58% before IBM cut prices in 1970, in conjunction with its introduction
of an upgraded CPU, and at least 20% (and in one case 33%) afterwards. California Computer
Products, 613 F.2d at 740 n.19. IBM anticipated that a new memory unit would earn a margin of
at least 20%. Telex, 367 F. Supp. at 306. Given these estimates, it is unlikely that CPU margins
could be high enough for IBM to care about peripheral innovation primarily as a means of
stimulating CPU sales.
71 Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975) (Decision & Order). See generally Willard K. Tom, The
1975 Xerox Consent Decree: Ancient Artifacts and Current Tensions, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 967
(2000). The FTC's complaint also challenged marketing practices for products covered by the
patents.
76 Roundtable Discussion on Competition Policy, Intellectual Property and Innovation Mar-
kets, in ROBERT D. ANDERSON & NANCY T. GALLNI, COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 447, 449 (1998) (remarks of Professor
F.M. Scherer).
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tion. 77 Under the settlement, Xerox agreed to license its patents for a small
royalty.
Although the FTC's legal theories would likely be thought of as adventur-
ous today 78 the FTC's remedy "accomplished a world of good": 79 it appears
77 Patent aggregation could inhibit price competition in product markets. It also could discour-
age innovation by a dominant firm's rivals, and thus potentially reduce innovation overall, for
multiple reasons. Cf BRONWYN H. HALL, CHRISTIAN HELMERS, GEORG VON GRAEVENITZ,
CHIARA ROSAZZA-BONDifENE, A STUDY OF PATENT THICKETS (2013) (empirical study conclud-
ing that patent thickets in a technological area discouraged entry into that sector). First, patent
aggregation may discourage rivals from challenging weak patents by making it more difficult for
rivals to prove that a dominant firm's patents are invalid or narrow in scope. See United States v.
The Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (Dominant firm's control of multiple patents in-
creased its likelihood of success in proving patent infringement by an importer with rapidly-
increasing U.S. sales.); id. at 177 n.2, 180, 190 (Dominant firm acquisition of control over multi-
ple patents reduced the likelihood that those patents would have their claims narrowed or collec-
tively be declared invalid.); id. at 198-200 (White, J., concurring) (Patent cross-licenses and
acquisitions lessened the likelihood that a potential rival or court would uncover information
about the nature and scope of prior art.). Second, a dominant firm's patent aggregation may
discourage rival innovative effort by making it more costly for a rival to review and analyze its
likelihood of prevailing in infringement litigation brought by the patent portfolio owner. David
L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 64-66 (2014)
(discussing the "numerosity problem"). Aggregation raises rivals' costs because it requires rivals
to analyze many patents in response to an infringement claim. Third, the aggregation of multiple
weak patents may increase the likelihood that some patent in the collection would be found valid
and broad in scope, thereby adding complexity and difficulty to licensing negotiations and in-
creasing the likelihood that the portfolio owner would assert infringement. Cf Bronwyn H. Hall,
Christian Helmers & Georg von Gravenitz, Technology Entry in the Presence of Patent Thickets
1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21455, 2015) (When products draw on
innovations protected by large numbers of patents with fuzzy boundaries, that can lead to "hold-
up of innovations, increases in the complexity of negotiations over licenses, increases in litiga-
tion" and "create incentives to add more and weaker patents to the patent system," thereby "in-
crease[ing] transaction costs, reduc[ing] profits that derive from the commercialization of
innovation, and ultimately reduc[ing] incentives to innovate."). Fourth, when a dominant firm
acquires weak patents, those transactions may shift patent ownership to a firm more likely to
enforce the patents against product market rivals, given the dominant firm's ability to profit
through product sales as well as through royalties. Cf Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Proba-
bilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 75, 88-90 (2005) (small product market rivals
may have suboptimal incentives to challenge patents asserted against them). The government has
challenged acquisitions in part for this reason. See, e.g., Amgen Inc., FTC No. C-4056 (Sept. 6,
2002) (Decision & Order), www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0210059/amgen-inc-im-
munex-corporation (preventing a combination of patent portfolios that threatened to allow the
merged firm to block future product market sales of IL-1 inhibitors by the only other firm devel-
oping a competing pharmaceutical product); see Final Judgment, United States v. Borland Int'l,
Inc., 1992 WL 101767 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1992) (preventing an acquisition of a dominant firm
by its leading rival under circumstances in which the dominant firm did not enforce uncertain
copyright rights against a third firm but the merged firm would likely have done so); see also
Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 56 Fed. Reg. 56,096, 56,100
(Oct. 31, 1991); Catherine Fazio & Scott Stern, Innovation Incentives, Compatibility, and Expro-
priation as an Antitrust Remedy: The Legacy of the Borland/Ashton-Tate Consent Decree, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 45 (2000).
78 See Tom, supra note 75, at 967 (stating that "many of the practices alleged in the complaint
or prohibited by the order seem innocuous to modern eyes").
79 Id. at 989.
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to have spurred R&D investment and entry by new rivals,80 and to have
woken up a lethargic monopolist, which then invested more as well.81 Firm
conduct after entry of the consent order thus suggests that Xerox responded to
increased rival investment in new product development by increasing its own
innovative effort,8 2 and that industry incentives to innovate increased overall.83
These industry outcomes offer an after-the-fact reason to question an ap-
propriability justification for Xerox's accumulation of patents.
With the benefit of hindsight, the framework set forth in this article can be
used to illustrate how an appropriability defense might have been evaluated as
of the time of the settlement, had it been offered. Xerox may reasonably have
anticipated that it would have kept a high market share if it and its rivals both
introduced new products. Xerox likely had a strong brand reputation, an ex-
tensive sales and service network, and perhaps an installed base dominated by
customers that had made investments in learning how to use its products, so it
may have expected that any erosion in its market share would be slow.8 4 Such
a prediction would have proven incorrect, as rivals successfully challenged
Xerox's leading position during the years following the settlement. That out-
come appears to have resulted mainly from the unanticipated entry of Japa-
nese firms, rather than anticipated entry by IBM and Kodak.85 Thus, it could
80 Cf Michael E. Porter & Yoko Ishikura, Canon Inc.: Worldwide Copier Strategy 12 (Harv.
Bus. Sch. Case No. 9-384-151, 1988) (describing Canon's R&D investment and patenting strat-
egy during the late 1970s and early 1980s); id. at 14 (Canon's 1983 slogan proposed to "Catch
Xerox through technological differentiation"); id. at 15 (Exhibit 1) (listing 17 new plain paper
copier models introduced by Canon in the United States between September 1972 and April
1983).
81 Tom, supra note 75, at 978-79. Cf Timothy F. Bresnahan, Post-Entry Competition in the
Plain Paper Copier Market, 75 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 15, 18 n.5 (1985) (deeming it
hard to tell whether greater competition or new technological opportunities from the invention of
microprocessors better explains the rapid increase in industry innovative activity); id. at 16-18
(After losing its monopoly, Xerox shifted from innovations in the copier to innovations in user
interfaces, perhaps reflecting competitive pressure to develop improvements with more commer-
cial interest than engineering interest.).
82 Xerox may have viewed its rivals' products (as distinct from rivals' investment in R&D) as
strategic substitutes, however. Bresnahan, supra note 81, at 17.
83 To similar effect, the compulsory licensing of German chemicals patents to U.S. firms dur-
ing World War I increased R&D investment by both the German firms and their U.S. rivals after
the war. See generally Joerg Baten, Nicola Bianchi & Petra Moser, Does Compulsory Licensing
Discourage Invention? Evidence from German Patents After WWI (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 21442, 2015).
84 Cf Porter & Ishikura, supra note 80, at 6 (indicating that in 1983, Canon had more than 600
U.S. dealers, for which it provided extensive financing and training in sales and service); id. at
8-9 (describing Canon's brand advertising in the United States from 1978 to 1982).
85 The FTC's chief economist at the time indicated that he expected IBM and Kodak to intro-
duce copiers but did not anticipate the smaller and more reliable products introduced by Japanese
firms. ANDERSON & GALHNI, supra note 76, at 448 (remarks of Professor F.M. Scherer). By the
early 1990s, Canon and Sharp both sold more copiers in the United States than Xerox, and




have been sensible at the time for Xerox to forecast that it would keep a high
market share. Xerox may also have anticipated that its advantages with cus-
tomers would not have been sufficient to protect it from losing market share
rapidly in the event rivals with strong reputations, such as IBM and Kodak,
introduced next-generation products but it did not.8 6
If these suppositions about Xerox's view of the consequences of new prod-
uct development are correct, then Xerox would have expected a substantial
incremental benefit from upgrading its own copier products in the event rivals
entered with new products. By developing a next-generation copier, Xerox
would have expected to avoid substantial customer losses and preserve a high
market share. Under such circumstances, the incremental benefit to Xerox of
introducing a next-generation product would likely have been greater in the
event rivals introduced new products than if rivals did not.87 Xerox, therefore,
would have been expected to increase its innovative effort in response to a
greater innovative effort by rivals. Such an anticipated response would have
provided reason to question an appropriability justification for Xerox's patent
accumulation.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has explained that a dominant firm's appropriability defense for
exclusionary conduct should be questioned, and often rejected, if the firm
would be expected to increase its own R&D effort in response to increased
R&D by its rivals. This approach for evaluating an appropriability defense
provides an additional argument beyond the main reasons offered in the eco-
nomic literature: the empirical literature emphasizes the importance of compe-
tition relative to appropriability as a motive for innovation and raises the
possibility that market factors would keep the dominant firm's payoff to inno-
vation success high if its exclusionary conduct is prohibited.
A dominant firm's likely response to increased rival R&D can be evaluated
by analyzing its likely incremental gain from new product development if its
rivals also introduce new products relative to its gain if its rivals do not up-
grade their products. The analysis incorporates three potentially observable
factors: the dominant firm's expected market share if it and its rivals introduce
new products, its expected customer loss if only rivals do so, and the conse-
quences of new product introduction for the dominant firm's profits from the
86 Bresnahan, supra note 81, at 16-17 (entrants obtained a high share of new placements
during the years in which Xerox did not compete with them on price.).
87 Copier firms sold complementary products-mainly toner and paper-but most of their
revenues came from copiers, and multiple firms produced complements. Thus, it is unlikely that
the sale of complements influenced Xerox's strategic response to rival R&D in copiers. See
Porter & Ishikura, supra note 80, at 5 (describing Canon's business in copier consumables and
accessories as of 1983).
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sale of complementary products. Three examples from historical monopoliza-
tion cases involving new product development illustrate the application of this
analytical framework to evaluate appropriability defenses in individual cases.
The case studies apply the proposed analytical framework in an informal
way, looking to three factors to determine whether the dominant firm would
be expected to regard rival R&D as a strategic substitute or strategic comple-
ment. To assess the dominant firm's incentives quantitatively, as economists
may seek to do in litigation,88 it would be necessary to estimate its incremental
profit from innovation in the event its rivals innovate and compare that to its
incremental profit in the event its rivals do not.89
The three case studies are intended to illustrate the analytical approach, not
to establish definitively whether an appropriability defense should have been
accepted in those cases. Still, as a group, they suggest that it would be neither
unusual nor surprising for dominant firms to respond to new product develop-
ment efforts of rivals with greater innovative effort of their own. That was a
plausible interpretation of the facts in each case, and borne out in retrospect
with respect to Xerox. This observation supports other reasons in the eco-
nomic literature for skepticism about relying on an appropriability justifica-
tion as a basis for framing antitrust rules or developing enforcement policy
regarding dominant firms.90
88 See John Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, ANTITRUST
SOURCE (Apr. 2015), www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/publishing/antitrust source/aprl5
full source.authcheckdam.pdf (reviewing the working paper predecessors to this article and the
companion economic article) ("It would be helpful to design an 'appropriability arithmetic' that
can place critical thresholds on the combination of these two factors [the dominant firm's share if
it and its rivals innovate, and its share losses if rivals innovate but it does not] that would allow a
more concrete prediction." Id. at 7.).
89 Supra note 39 and accompanying text.




ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING A
DOMINANT FIRM'S STRATEGIC
RESPONSE TO RIVAL R&D INVESTMENTS
This appendix draws upon the results in the related economic theory arti-
cle91 to identify factors affecting whether a dominant firm would increase its
R&D investment in new product development in response to greater R&D
investment by its rivals. The related article shows that the direction of the
dominant firm's response depends on whether it gains more from innovation
in the event other firms innovate too, relative to how much it would gain in
the event that others do not innovate.9 2
That comparison depends upon the dominant firm's likely payoffs from
innovation in four states of the world:93 its payoff from developing a new or
next-generation product in the event its rivals also do so (HSS), its payoff from
developing a new or next-generation product if it is the only firm to do so
(Hsf), its payoff in the event its rivals develop a new or next-generation prod-
uct and it does not (Hfs), and its payoff in the event no firm succeeds in devel-
oping new or next-generation products (HWf). The related article shows that the
dominant firm has an incentive to increase its R&D investment in response to
an increase in R&D investment by its rival if the dominant firm's incremental
gain from innovation success when its rivals also succeed (HSS - H ' ) exceeds
the dominant firm's incremental gain from innovation success when its rivals
do not innovate (Hsf - lff), or when A = (H S - Hfs) - (Hsf - H ff) > 0.
The expression A represents the incremental benefit of innovation success
to the dominant firm conditional on rival success, net of the incremental bene-
fit of innovation success conditional on rivals not innovating. The magnitude
of the dominant firm's R&D response to rival R&D investment (the slope of
its reaction function) is an increasing function of A.94 The example in this
91 Baker, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11.
92 The sign of the slope of the dominant firm's reaction function determines the direction of
indirect effect of dominant firm conduct excluding rivals from a product market on the dominant
firm's incentives to invest in R&D, discussed supra note 29 and accompanying text. The direct
effect of the exclusionary conduct also depends on the magnitude of the reaction function's shift.
93 In the notation, the first superscript indicates whether the dominant firm's innovative effort
succeeds (s) or fails (f), and the second superscript indicates whether its rivals succeed or fail.
94 This relationship is implied by equation (3) in Baker, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11,
at 7. (The dominant firm's best response function defined there, where it is denoted R', expresses
rival R&D investment as a function of dominant firm investment. In this discussion, the reaction
function has been inverted: the dominant firm's R&D investment is expressed as a function of
rival R&D investment. Hence equation (3) in that article implies that d(R') -'dA > 0.)
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appendix identifies economic factors that affect the size of these payoffs, and
thus the relative magnitudes of the two incremental gains and the sign of A.95
Suppose that two firms, a dominant firm and a rival, participate in a market.
If neither firm innovates, both firms charge price P0, the industry collectively
sells output Q0,96 the dominant firm's pre-innovation market share is So (with
0 < So < 1), and the dominant firm's marginal cost is C. Then, Hff = (P0 _
C)S 0Q0. If either firm succeeds in developing the new product, market demand
shifts out, so industry output increases to Q' (with Q' > Q0). Firms offering the
new product sell it at price P', which may exceed the price of previous genera-
tion products (p > P0). If the rival does not succeed, the dominant firm cap-
tures the entire market, so Hsf = (P' C)Q'. If the rival also succeeds, the
dominant firm's anticipated post-innovation market share is S' (with
0 < S' < 1), so HSS = (P' - C)S'Q'. Finally, if the rival succeeds but the
dominant firm does not, the dominant firm cannot charge more than P0 and it
loses Qd customers to its rival (with Qd < SOQO). 97 The rival may not gain the
entire market because the rival's new product may not be good enough to
overcome customer switching costs or factors like brand loyalty that may pro-
tect the dominant firm's market share from complete erosion. Hence,
Hfs = (pO _ C)(SOQO _ Qd). The four payoff terms are best viewed as present
discounted values of a stream of future profits. 9
In this example, A becomes
(1) A = (SS- Hfs) - (Sf- H)
= [(P' _ C)S'Q' _ (pO _ C)(SOQO _ Qd)] _ [(pl _ C)Q' _ (pO _ C)SOQO]
= (p0 _ C)Qd _ (1 SI) (P' _ C)Q'.
Equation (1) is intended to provide intuition about the factors influencing A; it
is not a formula that would be calculated when evaluating the likely nature of
dominant firm conduct in individual cases.
The dominant firm regards its rival's R&D investment as a strategic com-
plement if A is positive (A > 0), and as a strategic substitute if A is negative
91 It is termed an example rather than a model because it does not indicate how prices, indus-
try output, or market shares are determined. Moreover, in the states of the world in which the
dominant firm successfully innovates, the part of the dominant firm's payoff that would come
from profits on sales made before the new product is made available is ignored. Similarly, if the
dominant firm does not innovate but its rival does, the dominant firm's profits arising from sales
made before the rival makes its new product available are ignored.
96 The quantity sold in this and other states of the world may be thought of as cumulative over
the life of the product, with discounting ignored (or else with payoffs discounted under the
assumption that prices increase over time at the dominant firm's discount rate).
97 The difference between the rival's price and the dominant firm's price could be understood
as reflecting the value of product improvements to the marginal buyer.
98 This point may be important, for example, in evaluating forgone profit terms in industries in
which rivals have been gaining share in the pre-innovation setting and may be expected to gamer
an increasing share over time in the event all firms innovate.
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(A < 0). In equation (1), the sign is determined by the relative size of the two
(positively-signed) terms in the final line: (P0 -C)Qd and (I-S')(P'-C)Q'.
Those two terms represent profits captured from the dominant firm by its ri-
vals in different states of the world. The expression (P0 -C)Qd accounts for the
reduced contribution to dominant firm profits from sales lost to rivals in the
event that rivals innovate and the dominant firm does not, relative to what the
dominant firm would earn if neither it nor its rivals innovate. The second
term, (1-S')(P'-C)Q', reflects the lost contribution to dominant firm profits
from sales lost to rivals in the event both it and its rivals innovate, relative to
what the dominant firm would earn if only it innovates.
Equation (1) shows that A is an increasing function of both S' and Qd. A
high anticipated market share for the dominant firm in the post-innovation
product market in the event the dominant firm and its rival both introduce new
products (a high S') raises A by increasing the dominant firm's incremental
benefit of innovation success when its rival also succeeds (that is, by increas-
ing HSS). A substantial loss of customers from the dominant firm to its rival in
the event that the rival develops a new or next-generation product while the
dominant firm does not (a high Qd) raises A by increasing the incremental
payoff to the dominant firm from innovating when its rival succeeds (that is,
by reducing Hfs), because it reduces the dominant firm's payoff when its rival
succeeds and the dominant firm does not. Thus, increases in both S' and Qd
raise the dominant firm's incremental gain from innovation success in the
event its rivals also succeed (HSS - Hfs).
The extent to which the dominant firm's increased profits from the sale of
complements matters for the sign of A depends on the nature and extent of
competition in complementary products markets. At one extreme, if the domi-
nant firm is the only seller of the complementary products, it may be reasona-
ble to suppose that it will earn the same additional contribution to profit in
complementary goods markets when a new product is introduced, regardless
of whether it, its rival, or both successfully innovate.99 Adding this feature to
the example lowers A relative to the expression set forth in equation (1). If $D
represents the total incremental profits available from the sale of complemen-
tary products resulting from the introduction of a new product, and the domi-
nant firm expects to capture them regardless of which firm innovates, then
99 But perhaps not. If rivals innovate but the dominant firm does not, and if most of the
dominant firm's customers would switch to products sold by rivals, the strategic interaction be-
tween the two firms selling complementary products-one a sole seller (the dominant firm in the
complementary product) and the other nearly so (the rival in the primary product)-would affect
the margin the dominant firm receives on the complementary product. In particular, if the two
firms treat their products as Cournot complements, the margin on the primary product could rise.
Alternatively, and to similar effect, if primary market competition between the dominant firm
and its rival remains important, the dominant firm could increase the margin on the complemen-
tary product in order to soften primary market rivalry.
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A* = {[(HSS + $D) - (Hfs + $D)] - [(Hsf + $D) - H]} = A - $D < A. For $D
sufficiently large, A* < 0, implying that the dominant firm treats rival R&D as
a strategic substitute regardless of the sign of A. Intuitively, if the dominant
firm's profits from the introduction of a next-generation primary product
mainly derive from the profits it receives through increased sale of comple-
ments, then the dominant firm gains a great deal from introducing an up-
graded primary product when its rival does not but gains little from
developing its own new product when its rival has done so. Under such cir-
cumstances, the dominant firm would be expected to respond to a reduction in
rival R&D by increasing its own R&D investments and respond to an increase
in rival R&D by reducing its own investments.
The above analysis of the role of complementary goods in determining the
sign of A depends critically on the assumptions that overall profits are domi-
nated by profits in the sale of complementary products and that the dominant
firm is the only seller of complementary products. If instead the dominant
firm and its rival both sell complementary products, and the dominant firm
earns additional profits from the sale of complementary products following
the introduction of the new product only if it sells the new product, then A
would still be lower than the expression set forth in equation (1)-but not by
much if the dominant firm's anticipated market share is large. In particular, if
the dominant firm's share of the incremental profits available from the sale of
complementary products depends on its share of sales of new products, then
A** {[(Hss + S'() H- fs] - [(Hsf + (D) - Iff]} = A - (1 - S'), which
approaches A as S' approaches one. Moreover, and at the other extreme, if
multiple firms sell the complementary product, and the dominant firm would
not expect to make many incremental sales or would expect to earn only a
small margin on any incremental sales it does make, then the sale of comple-
ments would make little difference to A and, in consequence, not affect the
dominant firm's R&D investment decisions.
Even if the dominant firm regards rival R&D investment as a strategic sub-
stitute, the possibility that the dominant firm is also the dominant seller of
highly profitable complementary products could operate to ensure that the
dominant firm will continue to profit greatly from R&D investment if it is
prohibited from undertaking exclusionary conduct. 100 While the indirect effect
on its incentives to invest in R&D would work in the same direction from the
direct effect under such circumstances, both effects would be small. This pos-
sibility would justify a rejection of the dominant firm's appropriability de-
fense without the need to apply the analytical framework set forth in this
article.
100 Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Two implications of equation (1) are not emphasized in the text. First,
equation (1) indicates that the greater magnitude of the innovation-the more
the new product expands the market (higher Q') and the greater the value the
new product offers customers (and thus the higher the post-innovation markup
(P' C))-the less likely the dominant firm is to regard its rival's R&D in-
vestment as a strategic complement. The more the new product represents a
major improvement over existing-generation products, the more the incremen-
tal benefit of innovating in the event its rival also innovates will be dominated
by the dominant firm's payoff when both succeed (HSS), and the more its in-
cremental benefit in the event the rival does not innovate will be dominated
by its payoff when only it succeeds (Hsf). Of the two, the latter payoff is
greater because the dominant firm captures the market when it is the only
successful innovator, while it is limited to the fraction S' when both firms
succeed. In the limit as the innovation grows drastic, therefore, Hsf will con-
trol the sign of A, which will be negative. As the innovation becomes drastic,
however, that raises the possibility, outside the example, that the dominant
firm would continue to have strong incentives to invest in R&D even if exclu-
sionary conduct is prohibited because of the magnitude of the possible payoff,
notwithstanding its likely strategic response to greater rival R&D. 10 1 Accord-
ingly, this implication of the example is not relied on in discussing the case
examples.
Second, equation (1) also shows that a high dominant firm profit margin
pre-innovation (a lower C, holding P0 constant) tends to lead the dominant
firm to see its rival's R&D investment as a strategic complement if the domi-
nant firm's anticipated market share is high. The main reason is that, in the
example, a high pre-innovation margin tends to mean that post-innovation
margins will be even higher, increasing the dominant firm's incremental bene-
fits of innovation success when its rival also succeeds (by increasing HSS). But
a higher margin also affects the dominant firm's payoffs in the other three
states of the world, generating incentives that go in the opposite direction. In
the example, the latter incentives would dominate if the dominant firm's an-
ticipated market share is sufficiently small. 102 However, the above interpreta-
tion of the significance of a high pre-innovation profit margin turns on a
special feature of the example: the assumption that when both firms partici-
pate in the market (both succeed or both fail), they charge an identical price.
For this reason, and because of well-known difficulties of measuring marginal
cost, the discussion in the text does not discuss the dominant firm's pre-inno-
vation price-cost margin when analyzing the case examples.
101 Id.
102 That is, dA/dC < 0 if and only if (Qd/Q') + S' > 1, which is satisfied only if S' is sufficiently
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